Abstract-We propose a visual interactive method for the identification of the Prime Implicants (PIs) of dynamic non-coherent systems. Visual interactive methods integrate mathematical and symbolic models with runtime interaction and real-time graphic display, which allow visualizing the underlying physical relationships among process parameters. The proposed method is based on a parallel coordinates data mining tool that relies on an innovative pruning procedure which, on the basis of a proper selection of characteristic features of the accident sequences, retrieves the PIs among the whole set of implicants in terms of process parameter values or component failure states or both. The method is exemplified on an artificial case study, and then applied to the dynamic reliability analysis of the Airlock System of a Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor.
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YNAMIC reliability methods aim at complementing the capability of traditional static approaches (e.g., Event Trees (ETs), and Fault Trees (FTs)) by accounting for the system dynamic behavior and its interactions with the system state transition process [1] - [3] . An important task to be accomplished by dynamic reliability methods is the identification of Prime Implicants (PIs), which extend the traditional concept of minimal cut sets (mcs) for systems with dynamic interactions among physical parameters of the process, stochastic discrete failure events, and hardware and software or human errors [4] . PIs are thus defined as the minimal sets of process parameter values and components' failure states that are sufficient to cause a failure (top event) of a dynamic system. The logic behind these systems is that failed and working states of the same components can both lead the system to failure, i.e., systems have a non-coherent structure function. As an example, a system composed of components and for which a PI that causes a system failure is (components and failed, and component working) is a non-coherent system. Traditionally, non-coherent structure functions have been interpreted as an indication of poor system design. On the other hand, in [5] , it has been shown that an effective prioritization of maintenance actions can be done only by PI identification of non-coherent structure functions. With respect to the previous example, if components and have failed, then should be the last component to be repaired to avoid system failure. Furthermore, PI identification allows taking additional counteracting measures to prevent system failure, for example by forcing the failure of component when components and have already failed [6] .
In the circumstance of non-coherent structure functions, traditional methods, e.g., based on mcs analysis, cannot be applied for the identification of PIs [2] . Analytical methods [7] , [8] and graphical methods [9] have been introduced, even if the actual implementation of these methods becomes very time-consuming when the number of variables in the structure function is large [10] , and when the failure dependencies render the problem combinatorial [11] . The issue is one of completeness, i.e., one situation is when one has on hand an incomplete set of implicants from which he or she wants to identify the subset of PIs (which will also be incomplete); another is when one wants to identify a complete set of PIs. This latter situation is the one that has been daunting, and is here addressed. Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) provides a modeling and analysis environment in which the system variables are represented by a finite number of states, and the system dynamics are expressed by cause-and-effect relationships among these states. DFM is based on parameter value discretization, and can produce timed FTs, which are FTs in which timing relations among failure events are systematically taken into account [12] , [13] . Then, based on an optimized modification of the analytical method initially developed by Quine and McCluskey [7] , [8] , DFM yields time stamped PIs by deductive and inductive analysis aimed at determining how the system reaches a certain failure state. Another approach resorts to the formulation of the PI identification problem as a covering problem, i.e., the problem of covering a complete set of implicants by a given subset of PIs. In this form, the problem has been solved by transforming it into an optimization problem, where we look, resorting to evolutionary algorithms such as Genetic Algorithm (GA) [10] , and Differential Evolution (DE) [14] , for the minimum combination of implicants that can guarantee the best coverage of all the process parameter values and component failure states that make the system fail. These techniques have proven very effective, with significant computational savings, but often remain as black boxes as to the interpretation of the physical relationships among process variables and component failure occurrences.
In this work, a visual interactive method is proposed to overcome this latter limitation, and increase the confidence in the provided PIs. Interactions make users feel like "participants rather than spectators" [15] , and grasp complex, extensive information on the system behavior at the same time [16] , so that the decision making task can be facilitated [17] .
According to the degree of interaction between the user and the model, three classes of interaction and visualization can be described: post-processing, tracking, and steering [18] , [19] . Post-processing methods do not allow the user to observe intermediate results during the simulation, and she or he has no control over the process parameters that are driven by a third phenomenological model; output data are stored in a database, and later retrieved for being treated. Tracking methods offer intermediate observations of the results, and the user may follow the simulation by means of various visualization tools (e.g., multiple windows, charts animations). Finally, steering methods allow the user to interact with the system model during simulation, following the changes generated in the results [17] .
In this work, we aim at developing a visual interactive postprocessing method for treating a large number of accident sequences for retrieving (mining) the PIs of a dynamic system. Historically, one of the first visual data mining techniques being introduced is the grand tour [20] , [21] , which is an animation of the data, and whose basic idea is to look at a data cloud from all possible points of view; another useful technique for the visualization of high-dimensional and multivariate datasets on a two-dimensional plot is the parallel coordinates diagram [22] , which is in many senses a generalization of a two-dimensional cartesian plot: parallel coordinates are based on nodes which are on the parallel axis, and on edges which are those polylines linking the nodes on two neighboring axes [23] . However, the representation of massive amounts of data can lead to considerable overplotting, which can be misleading for the analysts [24] .
To tackle this problem in the context of PI identification, in this paper we implement an automatic pruning procedure of a parallel coordinates diagram that can be used for visualizing the accident sequences of a system, and for reducing the whole set of implicants into PIs. The key aspect of the automatic pruning procedure consists of the identification of a proper feature of the accident sequences that is directly related to the characteristics of minimal sets of process parameter values or component failure states, or both, that are sufficient to cause a failure (top event) of a dynamic system, i.e., the PI. This feature is the literal cost of the implicant (i.e., the number of components whose behavior is specified in the accident sequence). This technique can be seen as if implemented on a touch screen, where the analyst can interact with the model to prioritize the accident sequences according to their importance with respect to the system end state of interest, at the same time easily interpreting the relationships among the process parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the rationale behind the selection of literal cost as a key feature for an effective implementation of a visual interactive method used for PI identification. In Section III, we present the artificial case study, highlighting its non-coherence. In Section IV, we show the case study of the Airlock System (AS) of a Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor. In Section V, we apply the proposed technique to the case studies of Sections II and III, and discuss the results. Conclusion and remarks are given in Section VI.
II. THE METHOD In this work, we propose a novel method for PI identification of a dynamic non-coherent system that aims at guaranteeing interpretability of the representation and the results, with a controlled computational burden with respect to other dynamic reliability methods. The method is based on an innovative pre-selection of the feature that characterizes the accident sequences to be analyzed, to retrieve (mine) within the whole set of implicants those sequences that are PIs of the dynamic system under analysis. In particular, our method can be structured into four successive steps.
1. Feature selection. This first step marks the difference from other methods implemented for PI identification (e.g., analytical methods [7] , [8] , graphical methods [9] , DFM [12] , [13] , Meta-products Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [25] , [26] , or consensus BDDs [5] ), where the component state is the only information used for retrieving (mining) from the set of implicants the whole set of PIs. In this work, continuous process variables (i.e., temperature and pressure), or stochastic discrete variables (i.e., timing of component failure events, and the number of components whose behavior is specified in the accident sequence), are considered insightful features of the accident sequences. For our aim, because PIs are the minimal combination of process parameter values and component failure states among the whole list of conditions that bring the system into failure, we select the timing of component failures and the literal cost (i.e., the number of components whose behavior is specified in the accident sequence) as the most important features for PI identification according to a parsimony principle: PIs are indeed those combinations with as few as possible values and events that are capable of leading the system into a failure state [27] . 2. Simulation of accident sequences, depending on the problem at hand, is a suitable simulation tool for the accident evolution simulation. It is run (e.g., a thermal hydraulic code, a computational fluid dynamics code, a structural analysis code, a finite elements code, etc.) to collect the values of the optimally selected features of
Step 1 for all possible accident sequences, and identify all the combinations of process variable values and events which lead to the failure mode under analysis (implicants); among these, PIs have to be searched. 3. Representation of the accident sequences is a visualization of the accident sequences leading to the failure mode of interest, and is done using a parallel coordinates diagram. The idea of the parallel coordinates is to sacrifice the orthogonal axis to obtain a planar diagram, where each accident sequence is represented by a polyline that connects nodes on adjacent parallel axes. In agreement with the feature selection step, if the considered system is made of components, then the first parallel coordinates represent the states of the components, while the th axis corresponds to the literal cost of the simulated accident sequences. Note that, concerning the first coordinates, if the components are Boolean, then they can assume only two possible states (e.g., working or failed at a specific time instant); otherwise, if the components can be found in different states of functioning, or can fail at different times, it is necessary to resort to a multistate description. In our case, the different value levels of the multistate variables indicate the different time instants at which the components fail. In particular, with respect to a generic component , [29] . Reduced implicants are created starting from the whole list of those leading the system to the failure mode of interest. For interpretability, we propose to do this activity by an iterative procedure, composed of the following steps. a) The accident sequences associated with the lowest literal cost are selected and stored as PIs (for example, in case the procedure is implemented on a touch screen, by clicking on the corresponding node of the literal cost axis). In fact, these are the most reduced sequences (i.e., with the least number of events) that cannot be covered by any other implicant, and thus these are PIs by definition. b) The PIs selected in a) are removed from the diagram, together with those accident sequences that are visually verified to be covered by the selected PIs (i.e., implicants which have the same component state variables defining the removed PI, and other values for the variables whose component state is not defined (or it is a do not care value). As an example, in Fig. 1 , an application of this pruning is shown for a group of 25 accident sequences, in which the states of components , and are the same in all the sequences, whereas each sequence has a different combination of the states of components and , which can be in any state. The sequence with the minimal literal cost is selected as PI, and it is shown in a continuous line; it covers all accident sequences where and fail at , and does not fail. The sequences (implicants) shown in dashed lines can then be directly removed from the plot, because they are covered by the solid line PI, irrespective of the states of and . Note that the problem of scalability, which often arises when the number of accident sequences grows for very complex systems with a large number of components and states, can be easily addressed with the method here proposed for retrieving (mining) the hidden PIs from the set of implicants; any initial implicant sharing the accident sequence characteristics of the identified PI (but with larger literal cost) will be covered by the identified PI. c) Step a) and b) must be repeated on the remaining accident sequences until none are left on the diagram. At the end, the stored accident sequences are the PIs for the system failure mode under analysis.
III. ARTIFICIAL CASE STUDY
For illustration of the method proposed, we resort to an artificial case study built by simulating accident sequences for a system composed of 5 components (coded as and ) that can fail at pre-defined discrete times, giving rise to different sequences whose evolutions are represented by a monitored safety-relevant signal [28] , and Failure at . The equations used to simulate the safety-relevant signal evolution during each of the system configurations are shown in Table I . The values of , and are listed in Table II , and contribute to determining the magnitude of the failure events of the components and . A safety-relevant signal is monitored against pre-defined safety thresholds: if it exceeds the upper threshold value of 2.5 (in arbitrary units), the system fails in the High failure mode; if it decreases below the lower threshold value of , the system failure mode is Low. Examples of the safety-relevant signal, simulated for some accident sequences, are reported in Fig. 2 .
These simulated accident sequences aim at reproducing real conditions that can be envisaged in real complex systems, such as Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). One example could be the average temperature of the diathermic oil of the secondary loop of a Lead Bismuth Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS). If it goes beyond the upper threshold of 340 C, the oil physical and chemical properties could be degraded, whereas if it goes below the lower threshold of 280 C the structural components of the reactor could suffer from thermal shock [30] . Other examples are the fuel cladding temperature of the High Temperature-Pebble Modular Reactor (HTR-PM), and the water level of a pressurizer in a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR); the former must remain below the upper limit of 1600 C to provide the safety function of fission products [31] , [32] , whereas the latter must remain above a minimum level to avoid uncovering the electric heaters [33] .
We created the artificial case study to reproduce the trend conditions of a non-coherent system. In fact, as shown in Figs. 3 and  4 , both failed and working states of the same set of components can contribute to the failure of the system. In Fig. 3 (upper) , the safety-relevant signal evolution is shown when components and work for all the mission time, whereas component fails at at , and at ; this combination of failures allows the system to work in Safe conditions throughout the mission time.
On the other hand, in Fig. 3 (middle) , the same signal is plotted when components , and (recovered) work for all the mission time; and component fails at , and at . The safety-critical signal evolves to cross the lower threshold before the mission time, leading the system to the Low failure mode. Finally, when components , and (recovered) work for all the mission time; and component fails at , and at as in Fig. 3 (lower) ; then the system failure mode is High.
Another example of non-coherence is shown in Fig. 4 . A combination of three failures allows the system to work in Safe conditions (upper), whereas the recovery of component leads the system into the High failure mode (middle), and the recovery of component into the Low failure mode (lower).
In general, it can be concluded that the same combination of failed components does not lead unequivocally to one failure mode: when component failures occur at different times or with different magnitudes or both, the resulting failure mode can be different. For example, intuitively, if a failure occurs late in the mission time (as opposed to an early failure event), it may not lead to system failure, or vice versa (if the system is non-coherent) [3] .
IV. CANDU AIRLOCK SYSTEM
As a real case study, we have considered the Airlock System (AS) of a Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor. This is a safety system required to keep the pressure of the inner side of the reactor vault lower than the outer side to avoid the dispersion of contaminants out of the reactor bay, in case of accident (Fig. 5, top) . Therefore, to keep the leakage as low as possible, the only physical accesses to the reactor vault are the ventilation air piping system, the water piping system used for filling the water tank that feeds the over-pressure abatement sprays to be used in case of over-pressure accident, and the building access airlock system. This latter system consists of a vessel in the containment wall of the reactor vault, with two doors to allow the inspection of the vault. One door opens towards the inside of the reactor vault, the other towards the outside; so, at least one airlock door, whose seals are inflated via the air system, must be closed by a latch with sufficient pressure in the seals to fulfill its safety function (Fig. 5, bottom) . This model has been developed for analyzing a sequence that involves a Design Basis Accident (DBA) that occurred in 2011 in the AS of a CANDU nuclear power plant (NPP) [34] . During the accident, the inflation of the seals switched to the back-up air supply tank, and the considered failure event is the incapability of the AS to maintain the pressure boundary [34] . The possible causes for this event can be the pressure equalizer valve fails (V1), doors fail to close because latches are not locked (D1), and seals are cracked or cannot be inflated (S1). The pressure equalizer valves are designed to equalize the pressure between the reactor bay and the service side, and therefore to allow controlled flow between these two areas. The pressure equalization can fail due to gear box failure (G1) that may limit the vents from opening and closing, to the presence of leakages in the piping system (P1, P2), or to the failure of the exhaust pipe (E1). The airlock doors must be closed by a latch. Otherwise, the pressure equalizer valves and seals cannot be called into operation on demand. In addition, the possibility is considered that the backup tank is already empty (T1), or fails to engage (T2) when the inflation of the seals is switched to the backup air supply system. The basic failure events that can give rise to the AS failure are listed in Table III . 
V. RESULTS

A. The Artificial Case Study
In what follows, without loss of generality, we focus on the Low failure mode only, for which there are 1166 sequences (Step 2 of Section II) of different literal costs (Step 1 of Section II). In Fig. 6 , we represent the accident sequences on a parallel coordinates diagram (Step 3 of Section II), where the first five axes represent the state of the five components of the artificial case (components , and , respectively), whereas the sixth axis is the literal cost of each implicant. Each component is represented by a multistate variable, which can assume different values indicating No failure, Failure at , Failure at , or Failure at . For ease of representation, polylines have been slightly displaced to show the density of states in the diagram, so that the analysts can identify which states are the most common ones, and therefore which states most probably are those accident sequences that can be PIs for the Low failure mode.
It is evident from Fig. 6 that some nodes (states) appear more often in the accident sequences: the state corresponding to No failure for components , and ; and the state corresponding to Failure at for components and . This result can be confirmed by engineering judgment. The failure of components , and can cause the safety-relevant signal to increase (limiting the possibilities to go below the lower threshold), whereas the early failure of components and produce a decrease in the safety-relevant signal favoring the Low failure mode. For the same reason, Failure at of components , and ; and No failure of components and are the least dense nodes in the plot. Another interesting characteristic of Fig. 6 is the fact that some adjacent nodes are not connected. As an example, the nodes corresponding to No failure for components and are not connected by any accident sequence. This lack of connection means that there is no accident sequence where components and both appear in the No failure state; simulations show that components and are the only ones which can produce a Low failure mode, and therefore if they do not fail, the Low failure mode cannot be reached. An additional example of the important support provided by the parallel coordinates in interpreting and analyzing the accident sequences, is that the No failure state of component and the Failure at the state for component are not connected. Thus, we can be sure that the Low failure mode is avoided when component is failed at but component is safe. It is worth noticing that this first analysis of the accident sequences, even if qualitative and non-exaustive, is more informative than solely relying on the list of accident sequences (in terms of MVL sequences) that are of difficult interpretability, if not supported by an interaction and visualization, as it is for the parallel coordinates diagram.
After the qualitative analysis of the accident sequences, we can move to Step 4 of Section II. If we select from Fig. 6 the accident sequences with the minimal literal cost (equal to 3), we identify 69 PIs (reported in rows 1 through 69 of Table V) . Then, we can delete the 69 PIs from Fig. 6 , together with the sequences that they cover. The remaining sequences are shown in Fig. 7 .
In the second iteration, the 101 implicants with the second lowest literal cost (equal to 4) are selected from Fig. 7 as PIs (Table V, rows 70 through 170) . Then, we can delete the 101 PIs from Fig. 6 , together with the sequences that they cover. The remaining sequences are shown in Fig. 8 .
It is evident from Fig. 8 that all 10 sequences that are left on the plot have the same minimal literal cost, and they are all stored as PIs (Table V, rows 171 through 180) . Then, pruning is To validate the results obtained by the visual interactive method, we resort to an analytical technique, the consensus method for identifying PIs [29] . With this algorithm, we can identify the PIs from all the accident sequences by consensus operation: reduced implicants are created starting from the whole list of those leading the system to the failure mode of interest. The basic simplifying operation is called the merging rule: if implicants are the same except for exactly one -th event entry (where is the number of states that the variables that represent each component can assume, equal to 4 in this case), and all the possible states of the input variable exist in these implicants, then the implicants can be merged to form a more reduced implicant [29] . In Table IV , an example of the merging rule is shown. Four implicants are listed where components , and appear in the same state ( failed at failed at failed at , and working), while component appears with a different state in each implicant. By application of the merging rule, a reduced implicant is obtained, as reported in the last row of Table IV. The PI identification by consensus operation proceeds iteratively to the reduction of the list of implicants until all PIs are found (in seconds on an Intel Core2Duo P7550). In the artificial case study considered, the consensus method finds the same PIs for the Low failure mode as obtained by the proposed visual interactive method. In addition to the former one, the latter offers greatly improved interpretability of the results, and insightful information for qualitative analysis of the accident sequences (as previously discussed). This outcome is due to the proper selection of the features characterizing the accident sequences, and the straightforward algorithm for pruning the parallel coordinates diagram based on the information of the literal cost of the accident sequences. These results are obtained in about 1.5 seconds on an Intel Core2Duo P7550, a computational time ) comparable to other PI identification methods, and ii) that accounts for the 25% savings when applied on a problem of higher complexity with respect to the consensus method. 
B. CANDU Airlock System
The simulation of the accident sequences (Step 2 of Section II) allows us to find 16 867 sequences of different literal TABLE V continued  LIST OF PIS FOR THE LOW FAILURE MODE, IDENTIFIED BY THE VISUAL INTERACTIVE METHOD   TABLE VI  LIST OF PIS FOR THE AS CANDU REACTOR CASE STUDY, IDENTIFIED BY  THE VISUAL INTERACTIVE METHOD costs leading the AS to failure (Step 1 of Section II). In Fig. 9 , we represent the accident sequences on a parallel coordinates plot (Step 3 of Section IV), where the first nine axes represent the occurrence or non-occurrence of the nine basic failure events of Table III , whereas the 10th axis shows the literal cost of each sequence. The first iteration of the pruning step (Step 4 of Section II) leads to the identification of 4 implicants of minimal literal cost equal to 1 as PIs (Table VI, rows 1 though 4) . Then, we can delete the 4 PIs from Fig. 9 , together with all sequences they cover. The remaining sequences are shown in Fig. 10 . In the second iteration of the pruning step (Step 4 of Section II), the 3 sequences of second lowest literal cost (equal to 2) are selected as PIs (Table VI, rows 5 through 7) . These are removed from the diagram, together with those covered by them. After this step, no sequences are left on the plot, which means that all PIs found cover all the 16 867 accident sequences. The procedure has led to the identification of the 7 PIs, which are the same as those identified in [34] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a visual method for the identification of PIs. The method is based on a representation of the failure sequences on a parallel coordinates plot, which is suitable for processing a massive quantity of information. By way of an artificial example first, and a real case study second, we have shown that the proposed visual procedure is easy to handle, and fast to be implemented. Indeed, it is suitable for implementation on a touch screen, where the user can select the accident sequences just by touching on the screen. In addition, it allows identifying the dependencies among failure events, and intuitively understanding the physical relationships among them.
